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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AFSCME, NEW YORK COUNCIL 66, 
LOCAL 2574, COUNTY OF ALLEGANY 
EMPLOYEES (GENERAL UNIT) 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20123 
COUNTY OF ALLEGANY, 
Respondent. 
JOEL POCH, ESQ., for Charging Party 
BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, LLP (JOSEPH RANDAZZO of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER1 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by AFSCME, New York Council 66, 
Local 2574, County of Allegany Employees (General Unit) (AFSCME) to a decision of 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its improper practice charge alleging that 
the County of Allegany (County) violated §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally contracted with a private employer for an 
excavator and an excavator operator, work that has been exclusively performed by a 
Heavy Motor Equipment Operator II (HMEO II), a title within AFSCME's unit. The 
County has also filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision. 
1
 Member Abbott did not participate in this decision. 
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The ALJ found that the work in issue had been exclusively performed by unit 
employees in the past. The charge was nevertheless dismissed by the ALJ based upon 
the language of the management rights clause of the parties' January 1, 1997 -
December 31, 1999 collective bargaining agreement, which, the ALJ found, satisfied 
-the-Countyls duty to negotiate the assignments unit work to nonunit employees. 
AFSCME excepts to the ALJ's determination that the management rights clause 
evidences a satisfaction of the County's duty to negotiate a decision to subcontract. 
The County excepts to the ALJ's finding that the work in issue had been exclusively 
performed by unit employees. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
It is undisputed that the County undertook a culvert work project for the Village of 
Alfred in May 1998. Finding that other projects required the presence of the County's 
bridge construction crew and the County's two excavators, the County hired a private 
contractor to provide an excavator and an excavator operator to work with the County's 
bridge maintenance crew on the culvert work project. For several days in May 1998, the 
contractor's excavator operator excavated soil and assisted unit employees in setting 
new sluice pipe, backfilling soil and the demolition of the existing culvert - duties 
normally performed by an HMEO II in AFSCME's unit. 
The County-AFSCME contract contains a Management's Rights ciause, Article 
XXIV, which provides: 
Board - U-20123 
The Employer retains the sole right to manage its 
business affairs and services and to direct the working force, 
including the right... to determine when and to what extent 
the work required in operating its business and supplying its 
services [is] to be performed by employees governed by this 
Agreement.... 
In County of Livingston2 (hereafter County of Livingston), a case which also 
involved the unilateral transfer of unit work, the Management Rights clause in the 
parties' collective bargaining agreement contained the following language, almost 
identical to the Management's Rights clause here: 
The employer retains the sole right... to determine whether 
and to what extent the work required in operating its 
business and supplying its services shall be performed by 
employees covered by this Agreement....3 
We there determined: 
A union and an employer may satisfy by agreement their 
mutual duty to bargain a given subject, and thereby waive 
any further bargaining rights regarding the exercise of that 
contract right, without expressly stating in their contract that 
it was reached pursuant to the Act and was intended to fulfill 
the entirety of their statutory bargaining duty on that 
particular subject. Such a level of specificity has never been 
required as a condition to a finding of waiver by agreement 
either by this Board or in any other forum of which we are 
aware. We have, to the contrary, found a waiver by 
agreement in contract clauses which are broad when we 
have been persuaded that the language is a clear grant of 
right to the employer with respect to the subject matter of the 
improper practice charge. The particular management rights 
clause in issue here, which gives the County the right "to 
determine whether and to what extent the work required in 
226PERB 1J3074 (1993). 
3/c/at3142. 
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operating its business and supplying its services shall be 
performed by employees covered by [the] Agreement" is at 
least as specific as other agreements which have been held 
to constitute a waiver of further bargaining rights.4 (citations 
omitted) 
AFSCME correctly argues in its exceptions that a generally worded management 
rights clause does not evidences clear and-explicit-waiver•-.ofthe -right-to negotiate or- — 
clear evidence that the employer has satisfied its duty to negotiate.5 Here, however, the 
language of the County's Management's Rights clause represents the same type of 
specific evidence as the Management Rights clause in County of Livingston that the 
County has satisfied its duty to negotiate with AFSCME about the assignment of unit 
work to nonunit employees.6 : 
4ld. at 3143. 
5See New York City Transit Auth., 30 PERB 1J3004 (1997); State of New York 
(Unified Court Sys.), 28 PERB 1J3014 (1995); County of Broome, 22 PERB 1J3019 
(1989). 
6AFSCME also argues that the County should have been held to a higher 
standard of proof in the assertion of the defense that its duty to bargain had been 
satisfied by the Management's Rights clause and should have presented evidence of 
the parties' intent in reaching agreement on the language of the clause. However, such 
evidence would be parol evidence and, as we explained in Hempstead Public Sen. 
D/sf., 25 PERB H3025, at 3055 n.1 (1992): 
The parol evidence rule basically provides that an agreement which is clear in its 
terms and purports to express the parties' entire agreement on a subject cannot 
be contradicted, varied, or explained by the parties' prior or contemporaneous 
communications. Conversely, only contractual language which is vague, 
ambiguous or otherwise subject to more than one interpretation may be 
explained by parol evidence. See 58 N.Y. Jur.2d Evidence and Witnesses, 
§§ 555-618 (1986); Fisch, New York Evidence, §§ 41-64 (2d ed. 1977). 
We have endorsed the application of the parol evidence rule in our proceedings where 
appropriate. See Village of Port Chester, 18 PERB 1J3058 (1985). 
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AFSCME also argues that there is limiting language in Article XXIV of the 
collective bargaining agreement. The language relied upon by AFSCME provides that 
the County 
retains the sole right...to maintain order and efficiency in all 
its departments and operations, (including the procedures 
setiorth in,the Civil Service.Law and-other laws of the State 
of New York).... 
The ALJ addressed this argument in her decision. Pointing to both County of 
Livingston and City of Poughkeepsie v. Newman (hereafter City of Poughkeepsie),7 the 
ALJ determined that the language of Article XXIV was not of the type of limiting 
language as was found in City of Poughkeepsie. Rather, the reference to the Act is of 
the general type found in County of Livingston and Garden City Union Free School 
District* where we held: 
The employer's right in City of Poughkeepsie was specifically subjected to 
the requirements of the Act, which include a duty to bargain. In this case, 
the District's exercise of a contract right to subcontract which has been 
obtained as a result of collective bargaining under the Act is simply not 
"inconsistent" with the Act. In that circumstance, the decisional bargaining 
obligations under the Act have been satisfied as a result of the bargaining 
that produced the agreement. 
Here, as the ALJ found, the County's right to assign unit work to nonunit 
employees is unqualified and unrestricted by the reference in the Management's Rights 
795 A.D.2d 101, 16 PERB fl7021 (3d Dep't 1983), appeal dismissed, 60 N.Y.2d 
859, 16 PERB TI7027 (1983). 
!27 PERB P029, at 3071 (1994). 
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clause to procedures under the Civil Service Law. We find, therefore, that the County 
has satisfied its duty to negotiate about the subject matter of the charge.9 
As to AFSCME's final exception, that the ALJ erred by not finding that the 
County had violated §209-a.1(a) of the Act, there is no evidence in the record which 
would support afindingthatthe Countyviolated this section ofthe Act.l0'The allegation 
was, therefore, properly dismissed by the ALJ. 
Because of our finding as to duty satisfaction, we do not reach the County's 
exceptions.11 Based upon the foregoing, we deny AFSCME's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: March 31, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
9See County of Nassau (Police Dep't), 31 PERB P064, at 3142 (1998), where 
we held that whether characterized as waiver, contract reversion or duty satisfaction, 
"under this particular defense, a respondent is claiming affirmatively that it and the 
charging party have already negotiated the subject(s) at issue and have reached an 
agreement as to how the subject(s) is to be treated, at least for the duration of the 
parties' agreement." 
10See Town of North Hempstead, 32 PERB P006 (1999), for the necessary 
elements of a violation of §209-a.1 (a) of the Act. 
11See State of New York (Dep't of Health), 32 PERB lf3067 (1999). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS 
AND POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20986 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES-WENDE 
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY), 
Respondent. 
HINMAN, STRAUB, PIGORS & MANNING, PC (EDWARD J. GREENE, . 
JR., of counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York 
(Department of Correctional Services - Wende Correctional Facility) (State) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice charge filed by 
the New York State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 
(NYSCOPBA) alleging that the State had violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally ending a practice or policy of allowing 
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correction officers at Wende Correctional Facility (Wende) to depart the facility within 
three minutes of the end of a shift. 
The parties entered into a Stipulation of Facts. The factual record was then 
reviewed by the ALJ who found that the State had violated §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act. 
The State excepts-to the findings-made by the ALJ on both factual and legal ^ 
grounds. The State contends that there was no practice, that Article 27 of the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement is a source of right for NYSCOPBA thereby divesting 
PERB of jurisdiction, and that the ALJ erred in finding a violation. NYSCOPBA 
supports the ALJ's decision. 
After our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, we 
') reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
On the basis of the stipulated record, the ALJ found, without any further 
evidence, either testimonial or documentary, regarding the attendance procedure at 
Wende, that a practice existed of permitting employees to leave up to three minutes 
prior to the end of their shift without charge to leave accruals. 
We have consistently held that, in order to prove a past practice, a party must 
demonstrate that the "practice was unequivocal and was continued uninterrupted for a 
period of time sufficient under the circumstances [footnote omitted] to create a 
reasonable expectation among the affected unit employees that the [practice] would 
continue."1 
,J 
'County of Nassau, 24 PERB ^3029, at 3058, aff'g 24 PERB 1J4523 (1991). 
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Section 209-a.1 (d) presumes that the employer's duty to negotiate in good faith 
under the Act "includes an obligation to continue past practices that involve mandatory 
subjects of negotiation, even in the absence of a provision to that effect in the 
[collective bargaining agreement]."2 
The-stipulated record consists of the collective bargaining agreement and four 
memoranda discussing time and attendance work rules and a three minute discrepancy 
in the time clock. Prior to the 1993 memorandum noting the time clock discrepancy, 
there is no record evidence of a procedure and/or practice authorizing employees to 
punch out three minutes early. Significantly, the Stipulation of Facts contains the 1989 
memorandum which outlined the department's time and attendance rules governing the 
normal workday, tardiness, early departure and excused absences.3 The normal 
workday is 8 hours for 40-hour employees and TA hours for 37%-hour employees. 
Early departures without a payroll deduction must be authorized or directed. An 
unauthorized early departure results in a payroll deduction and possible disciplinary 
action. 
The memoranda discussing the three-minute time clock discrepancy cover the 
period of 1993 to 1999. The 1993 memorandum4 merely indicated that due to the time 
clock discrepancy "a recorded time of up to three minutes prior to the actual dismissal 
2County of Nassau, 13 PERB 1T3095, at 3153 (1980), citing Queens Borough 
Public Library, 8 PERB 1J3085 (1975)'.' 
3Exhibit 5, Stipulation of Facts. 
) . 4Exhibit 6, Stipulation of Facts. 
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time will not be regarded as an unauthorized early departure." There is nothing in this 
language that authorizes early departure, except as in accordance with the 1989 time 
and attendance memorandum. 
The 1998 memorandum5 attempted to clarify any confusion that existed 
conceming4he-1993 memorandum vis-a-vis the 1989 time and attendance 
memorandum. The 1998 memo also reiterated that there was no authorization for 
employees to punch out three minutes prior to the end of their work shift. 
NYSCOPBA contends that the 1999 memorandum6 unilaterally canceled the 
disputed practice. In this memorandum, Superintendent Donnelly again reiterated that 
the employees at Wende were not authorized to punch out three minutes prior to the 
"l end of their shift. Rather, he provided an example of how a nonchargeable three 
minute discrepancy could occur on an employee's time card. This example was 
provided to the employees in order to correct any mistaken interpretation of the two 
previous facility memoranda. He noted that a practice apparently had developed and, 
at the same time, acknowledged that such a practice resulted from the employees 
"misinterpretation of Directive #2201, revision notice dated March 6, 1993." The use of 
the word practice was a mischaracterization of the events surrounding the memoranda. 
The alleged practice was not unequivocal because the stipulated record fails to 
demonstrate that the State had consented to it. The memoranda of 1998 and 1999 
5Exhibit 7, Stipulation of Facts. 
6Exhibit 8, Stipulation of Facts. 
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merely notified the employees of a continuing problem the administration at Wende 
experienced with employee time card records as the result of the malfunctioning time 
clock. It cannot be concluded from the stipulated record that the State acquiesced in 
the employees construing the memoranda that advised them of the time clock 
malfunction as permitting them to leave work-three minutes-before the end of their shift. -
It is well settled that requiring employees to participate in recording attendance is 
a mandatory subject of bargaining.7 We have also held that once an attendance 
recording system is in place, the mere substitution of one manner of employee 
participation for another does not constitute a change in terms and conditions of 
employment.8 
There is no record evidence that employees' shifts, the length of the workday, or 
the manner of recording employees' working hours, that is, the time clock, was changed 
by virtue of the memoranda dated 1993, 1998 and 1999. The only effect of these 
memos was to alert employees who punched their time card at the conclusion of their 
shift that a three-minute time discrepancy on their time card at the end of their shift 
would not affect their pay. The fact that the State is still relying on the time cards as a 
record-keeping device, albeit that they could contain up to a three-minute time 
7Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth., 21 PERB H3065, aff'g 21 PERB 1J4561 
(1988) [citing County of Monroe, 20 PERB 1J4598 (1987)]; Buffalo Sewer Auth., 18 
PERB 114615 (1985); County of Nassau, 13 PERB 114612 (1980); East Quoque Union 
Free Sch. Dist, 12 PERB 1J4555 (1979)]. See also Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist, 
20 PERB 1J3053 (1987), and the cases cited therein at note 2. 
aSee Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth., supra note 7, at 4655. County of 
Nassau, 31 PERB 1J3032 (1998), aff'g 30 PERB 1J4690 (1997). 
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discrepancy, does not constitute a material alteration in the degree of employee 
participation that has been required since 1989. 
The memoranda found in the record did not, therefore, change the employees' 
terms and conditions of employment. In point of fact, the memoranda reiterated the 
time and attendance rules and-merely indicated how discrepancies caused bythe time 
clock would be treated, consistent with those rules. Thus, the 1999 memorandum did 
not unilaterally discontinue a past practice which would have given rise to a §209-a.1(d) 
violation. 
Having determined that the State had no duty to negotiate the terms of the 1999 
memorandum, it is not necessary to reach the State's other exceptions. 
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the ALJ's decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 31, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
; 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-20348 
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY 
OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO), 
Respondent. 
JANICE L. MORITZ, for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the United University Professions 
(UUP) to an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision which dismissed its charge 
against the State of New York (State University of New York at Buffalo) (State). 
UUP filed a charge alleging violations of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act), asserting among other things, that the State 
denied Dr. Joan M. Sulewski access to the University Physicians Office (UPO) on 
June 5, 1998 in retaliation of her protected activities as UUP Buffalo Health Sciences 
Center Chapter President. 
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The State moved to dismiss the charge at the conclusion of UUP's case. The 
ALJ reserved decision on the motion. The ALJ then directed the State to present its 
case.1 After reviewing the record, the ALJ dismissed the charge.2 We agree. 
The UUP filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision. UUP generally excepts to the 
-factual determinations made by the ALJ andthe conclusions drawn-therefrom 
We have held that in order to establish improper motivation under §209-a.1(a) 
and (c) of the Act, a charging party must prove that (a) he/she had been engaged in 
protected activities, (b) the respondent had knowledge of and (c) acted because of 
those activities.3 If the charging party proves a prima facie case of improper motivation, 
the burden of persuasion shifts to the respondent to establish that its actions were 
^ motivated by legitimate business reasons.4 
We have held that the charging party can establish "[t]he existence of anti-union 
animus . . . by statements or by circumstantial evidence, which may be rebutted by 
1Transcript, p. 99. 
2Since the ALJ considered the testimony of the State's witness and its 
explanation of the business reasons for its determination, the charge was dismissed on 
the merits even though the State's motion to dismiss was not specifically addressed in 
the ALJ decision. 
3Town of Independence, 23 PERB 1J3020 (1990). See also City of Salamanca, 
18 PERB 1|3012 (1985); City of Corning, 17 PERB 1J3022 (1984); City of Albany, 
4 PERB 1f3056 (1971); Town of Newark Valley, 16 PERB H4621, aff'd, 16 PERB 1J3102 
(i»oo). 
ACity of Salamanca, supra; Captain's Endowment Ass'n (Mallory), 15 PERB 
1J3019 (1982); City of Albany, 3 PERB H4507, aff'd, 3 PERB 1J3096 (1970), conf'd in 
pertinent part, 36 A.D.2d 348, 4 PERB 1J7008 (3d Dep't 1971), aff'd, 29 NY2d 433, 
5 PERB K7000 (1972). See Mount Healthy City Bd. ofEduc. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 
(1977). 
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presentation of legitimate business reasons for the actions taken, unless found to be 
pre-textual."5 Proof that the employer's stated reasons for its conduct are pretextual 
may constitute such circumstantial evidence.6 
On the record before us, we find no evidence of anti-union animus adduced at 
the hearing. The parties stipulated on the record that Dr. Sulewski was engaged in 
protected activity, i.e., UUP Chapter President since 1986 and in that capacity had filed 
grievances, all of which was well known to the State. 
The uncontroverted record demonstrates that Dr. Sulewski is an Associate 
Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB/GYN) at the medical school of the State 
University of New York at Buffalo. As a faculty member, she participated in the 
OB/GYN's practice plan. This plan enabled faculty members to see patients and also 
served as a teaching tool for medical students. The University established an on-
campus office (UPO). 
On January 1, 1997, Dr. John Wright was appointed Interim Dean and Vice-
President of Health Sciences at the Medical School. It was then that he learned that 
the Medical School had accumulated debt of some nine million dollars, of which four 
million dollars was directly attributed to the University Medical Physician's Services 
(UMPS), including the UPO. Consequently, in January 1998, Dr. Wright convened a 
5Town of Independence, supra note 3, at 3038. See also Convention Ctr. 
Operating Corp., 29 PERB 1J3022 (1996); City of Rye, 28 PERB P067 (1995), cont'd, 
234 A.D.2d 640, 29 PERB TJ7021 (3d Dep't 1996). 
6See CityofUtica, 24 PERB P044 (1991); Town of Henrietta, 28 PERB 1(4605, 
aff'd, 28 PERB fl3079 (1995). 
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meeting with the department chairs who had faculty involved with the UPO and 
informed them that the UPO would be closed. 
Dr. Margaret McAloon, the Medical Director of the UPO, notified staff by memo 
dated April 17, 1998, that the UPO would close on May 29, 1998. 
In response to Dr, Sulewski's-need for an alternate practice site, Dr. Wright,-
together with Dr. Phyllis Leppert, the chairperson of the OB/GYN department, sought 
out alternate sites. After a failed attempt to establish a practice site at the nearby VA 
Hospital, Drs. Wright and Leppert sought to place Dr. Sulewski at Creekside, which was 
another local facility. On June 3, 1998, Dr. Sulewski was notified that Creekside had 
been secured as her practice site. 
However, on June 5, 1998, Dr. Sulewski called the UPO to request permission to 
use the facility to remove staples from one of her patients. Dr. McAloon testified that 
the UPO was without supplies and support staff. Dr. Sulewski's request was denied. 
Dr. Sulewski was UUP's only witness. The ALJ found that she failed to establish 
that the State denied her access to the UPO on June 5, 1998 because of her protected 
activity. We agree. 
UUP contends in its exceptions that Creekside, the new outpatient clinic the 
State had secured for Dr. Sulewski, was unavailable to her on June 5, 1998. While this 
may be true, UUP has failed to demonstrate that the delay in securing this facility was in 
retaliation for Dr. Sulewski's protected activity. On the contrary, the record of 
correspondence from the State to Dr. Sulewski dates back to January 1998 when she 
was placed on notice that the UPO was to close on May 29, 1998. The 
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correspondence from the State to Dr. Sulewski demonstrated that the VA Hospital was 
the State's first alternate practice site for her to see her patients. However, during the 
period March 10, 1998 to May 4, 1998, requests from Dr. Leppert to Dr. Sulewski for 
information to complete the negotiations with the VA Hospital administration were 
ignored^ Dr, Sulewski in her testimony provided no plausible explanation for her-failure 
to respond to the requests for information. This delay occasioned by Dr. Sulewski made 
it impossible for the State to complete the negotiations with the VA Hospital 
administration by May 29, 1998. Consequently, the State was forced to look elsewhere 
for Dr. Sulewski's practice site and secured the Creekside clinic in June, 1998. 
UUP also contends that the ALJ erred in making a credibility determination in 
favor of Dr. McAloon and Dr. Wright. We disagree. Credibility determinations are 
generally reserved until the conclusion of an entire case. It is only then that the 
witnesses have been examined and cross-examined and the trier of fact has had an 
opportunity to observe and evaluate the demeanor of all witnesses.7 We see nothing 
in the record to disturb the ALJ's finding.8 UUP contends that McAloon's testimony 
contradicts Dr. Wright. We see no such contradiction. UUP elicited testimony from 
7City of Lockport and AFSCME, Council 66, 22 PERB1J3059 (1989). See also 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). "The Sixth Amendment.. . . guarantees the 
right of... confrontation...cross-examination." See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 
418 (1965). "The opponent demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing 
upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-
examination . . ." 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence, §1395, p. 123 (3rd Ed. 1940). See also 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The value of cross-examination lies in its use to 
expose falsehood and bring out the truth. 
8See DeVito v. Kinsella, 234 A.D.2d 640, 29 PERB ^7021 (3d Dep't 1996). It is 
not the function of a reviewing court to reject testimony or substitute its judgment on 
matters of credibility. 
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Dr. McAloon regarding UPO's overhead expenses shared by the doctors, including 
Dr. Sulewski. Dr. Wright testified regarding his share of the expenses. He made no 
mention of rent and further testified that the University waived rent payment. In an 
attempt to discredit Dr. Wright, UUP has mischaracterized his testimony in its brief to 
the ALJ in order to-reach a conclusion regarding physicians' expenses at the UPO 
which was unsupported by the evidence. 
Lastly, UUP's reliance on Rockville Centre Union Free School District (hereafter 
Rockville Centre)9 is misplaced. We reversed the decision of the ALJ in Rockville 
Centre. We found, as here, that the conclusions made by the charging party were not 
supported by the evidence. Since UUP has failed to demonstrate a nexus between Dr. 
Sulewski's acknowledged protected activity and the State's management decision 
preventing her from using the UPO, we need not reach the State's legitimate business 
defense. 
Based on the foregoing, we hereby deny UUP's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 31, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michae/R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
932 PERB TJ4532 (1999), rev'd, 32 PERB ^3050 (1999). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RAMAPO POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-20685 
TOWN OF RAMAPO, 
Respondent. 
SCHLACHTER & MAURO (REYNOLD A. MAURO of counsel), for Charging 
Party 
ALAN M. SIMON, COUNTY ATTORNEY (JACK SCHLOSS of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Ramapo Police Benevolent 
Association (Association) to a decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director) dismissing its improper practice charge alleging that the 
Town of Ramapo (Town) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it continued to assign police lieutenants, who had opted out 
of the bargaining unit, to the same assignments as they had been given prior to opting 
out of the unit. 
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The parties submitted the matter on stipulated facts. The factual record was 
then reviewed by the Director who dismissed the charge on the ground that there had 
been no change in practice. 
The Association excepts to the Director's decision that there had been no 
change in practice, arguing instead that the parties never stipulated thatthe-sergeants' 
duties in question were previously performed by the lieutenants prior to their opting-out 
of the unit. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
It is well established that the duty to make a prima facie case rests with the 
charging party alone.1 
The parties limited the record before us to the stipulated facts.2 The stipulated 
record contained certain salient facts that established: 
(a) the Recognition clause of the parties' collective bargaining agreement 
includes the title of Lieutenant.3 
(b) the parties' collective bargaining agreement permitted Lieutenants to "opt 
out" of the bargaining unit.4 Once the election to "opt out" had been made, it 
was to be effective for the Lieutenant's terms of employment with the Town. 
1
 County of Nassau (Police Dep't), 17 PERB 1J3013 (1984). 
2TJTenth of the Stipulated Facts. 
^Second of the Stipulated Facts. 
^Second of the Stipulated Facts. 
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(c) Five of the six Lieutenants elected to "opt out".5 
(d) The Association filed an improper practice charge alleging: 
That the Ramapo Police Benevolent Association (herein 
after referred to as the "PBA") on or about the 22nd day of 
February, 1999 filed the within unfair labor practice charge 
alleging inter alia as follows: 
On October 25, 1998 and November 28, 1998, the 
Employer began scheduling Lieutenants, including 
non-unit Lieutenants to fill in gaps in the schedules 
created by absence of Sergeants. December 1998, 
the employer began scheduling Lieutenants, including 
non-unit Lieutenants to Sergeant's duties to fill in 
these gaps in the schedule. The duties of the 
Sergeants have exclusively been performed by 
members of the unit, to wit: Sergeants and Senior 
Police Officers, working shifts where a Sergeant is 
absent. The above constitutes an improper 
delegation of unit works to non-unit employees. 
(e) The Town denied any change in the assignment of unit or non-unit 
Lieutenants . . . .6 
(f) . . . the issue to be decided . . . did the Town violate §209-a.1(d) of the act 
when it continued to give Police Lieutenants who, pursuant to contract, 
opted out of the PBA unit, the same assignments as they had before opting 
out of the Unit?7 
^Fourth of the Stipulated Facts. 
^Seventh of the Stipulated Facts. 
^Eighth of the Stipulated Facts. 
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The Director concluded that the parties' stipulated issue recognized that there 
had been no change in practice which would give rise to a violation of the Act simply by 
a continuation of the same assignment to Lieutenants who have opted out of the unit. 
We agree. 
The Association urges in its exceptions that the-Directorerred in the conclusion 
reached in his decision. The Association argues that the parties never stipulated that 
the duties in question were ever performed by those Lieutenants, as Lieutenants; prior 
to opting-out of the Unit, and that the Director erred by presuming that the duties in 
issue were previously performed by Lieutenants prior to opting-out. The Stipulated 
Facts, however, do not include any facts associated with the argument the Association 
makes in its exceptions. Since the Association had the duty to make out its prima facie 
case, it is clear from the record that there has been no unilateral change in the parties' 
practice. 
The Association ignores the fact that the Recognition Clause includes the title of 
Lieutenant. Notwithstanding the discretion given to any one of the Lieutenants in the 
bargaining unit to "opt out", the title remained in the bargaining unit. Furthermore, the 
Recognition Clause expressly states that once a Lieutenant "opts out", it was to be 
effective for that Lieutenant's terms of employment with the Town. The Recognition 
Clause merely excluded a Lieutenant who "opted out" from coverage under the terms of 
the collective bargaining agreement. The agreement, therefore, did not prevent, 
exclude, limit or otherwise modify assignments Lieutenants may be required to perform. 
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Based on the foregoing, we deny the Association's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the Director. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED:- March 31,-2000-
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ /MarcvA. Abbott, MeWr6er 
JoHn T. Mitchell, Member 
n STATE OF NEW YORK PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS, LOCAL 832S, AFL-CIO, 
-~-: Petitioner,-
- and - CASE NO. C-4930 
TOWN OF COHOCTON, 
Employer. 
SHAPIRO, ROSENBAUM, LIEBSCHUTZ & NELSON (PETER NELSON 
of counsel), for Petitioner 
HARRIS, BEACH & WILCOX (MELISSA A. FINGAR of counsel), for 
Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On August 17, 1999, the International Union of Operating Engineers, 
Local 832S, AFL-CIO (petitioner), filed, in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a timely petition seeking 
certification as the exclusive representative of certain employees of the Town of 
Cohocton (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they 
stipulated that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: All regular fuli-time employees of the Town's Highway 
Department. 
Case No. C-4930 -2 
Excluded: Office clerical, supervisory and managerial employees, and 
the Highway Assistant Superintendent. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on March 1, 
2000, at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the 
petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the 
eligible voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the 
purpose of collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the 
petition should be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 31, 2000 
Albany, New York 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
.... _.... ....... : Petitioner, 
- a n d - CASE NO. C-4946 
ISLIP PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
Employer. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL ORTIZ of counsel), for 
Petitioner 
MARY SCHUBART, for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On November 5, 1999, the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (petitioner), filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure 
of the Public Employment Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the 
exclusive representative of certain employees of the Islip Public Library (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating units were appropriate: 
Unit 1: Included: Librarian, Librarian Trainee, and Department Heads. 
Excluded: Director and all others. 
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Unit 2: Included: Custodial Worker, Monitor, Housekeeper, Library Clerk, 
Library Clerk/Typist, Page, Clerk, and Clerk/Typist. 
Excluded: Administrative Assistant to the Director, Account-Clerk 
and all others. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on February 22, 
2000, at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in the units who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 31, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Mich,ael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY EMPLOYEES, 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 72, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, 
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19497 
NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
BRIAN M. LUCYK, ESQ., for Charging Party 
THOMAS FITZGERALD, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York State Thruway 
Authority (Authority) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper 
practice charge filed by the New York State Thruway Employees, Teamsters Local 72, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America, AFL-CIO (Teamsters). The ALJ found that the Authority violated §209-a.1 (d) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally subcontracted 
to private contractors, pavement marking, which had been exclusively performed by 
employees in the unit represented by the Teamsters. 
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The Authority argues that the ALJ erred in finding the charge to be timely filed, 
that the equipment used by the private contractor was not technologically different from 
the equipment used by unit employees, and that the tasks performed by the private 
contractor are substantially the same as those performed by unit employees. The 
Authority further argues that the ALJ erred as a matter of lawand that the ALJ's order 
cannot be implemented because unit employees have not been trained to do the work 
in-issue. The Teamsters argue that the Authority's exceptions are without merit and that 
the ALJ's decision and order should be affirmed. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
Facts 
Among the functions performed by unit employees is the marking of pavement at 
toll stations, rest areas, parking lots and on the roads owned and operated by the 
Authority. The parties stipulated that the members of the unit represented by the 
Teamsters have exclusively been responsible for pavement marking using lead-based 
or water-based paint at all these locations except when such marking has been 
ancillary to a highway construction or rehabilitation project involving the roadways. On 
those occasions private contractors have used epoxy for pavement marking. Members 
of the bargaining unit have never been responsible for pavement marking that has 
utilized epoxy. 
; 
Board - U-19497 -3 
In 1993, the Authority contracted with a private contractor to mark pavement 
utilizing epoxy at certain locations in its Buffalo division.1 Unit members testified that a 
supervisor, Calvin Fechter, a Thruway Maintenance Specialist, told them in 1993 that 
the Authority was experimenting with the use of epoxy for pavement marking in certain 
heavily trafficked interchanges and that they should avoid painting-in those areas with 
water-based paint. After 1993, the Authority did not utilize epoxy for pavement marking 
until 1997.2 
In 1996, the Authority purchased for $232,000 a new road-marking vehicle, the 
LDI, that would be used only for the application of water-based paint. Prior to that time, 
a variety of machinery and vehicles had been use by the Authority to mark pavement. 
Some had to be pushed or pulled, some were vehicles with the pavement marking 
machinery already attached, some had furnaces to heat the lines and/or the paint, and 
some had gauges that had to be monitored by the driver or the operators. Initially, the 
paint applied was oil-based and required a toxic chemical to clean the paint feeding 
lines. The newer vehicle, the LDI, applied water-based paint and could be cleaned by 
using water to flush the lines. All of the equipment utilized paint mixed with glass beads 
1The Authority has four administrative divisions: New York, Albany, Syracuse 
and Buffalo. 
Apparently, in 1990, the Authority received budget approval for contract 
installation of epoxy pavement marking at all interchanges in the Buffalo division. There 
is nothing in the record to indicate that any such marking utilizing epoxy took place in 
1990 or why it was not until 1993 that the Authority contracted with a private contractor 
for the approved pavement marking utilizing epoxy. The Authority never informed the 
Teamsters of the 1990 budget project approval or the 1993 subcontracting. 
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and applied either using gravity or under pressure on the roadway. The older 
equipment had a pointer mounted on the front to line up the line to be painted; the 
newer equipment uses a laser pointer to ensure a straight, even line. The older 
equipment required only one employee to operate it; the LDI is operated by a driver and 
two or more other employees working the painting equipmentand inspecting the — 
roadway. With the purchase of any new equipment, the employees were trained by 
factory representatives, usually for about two weeks, in the operation and maintenance 
of the new equipment. Unit employees have also experimented at the Authority's 
direction with other material and methods for pavement marking. 
On August 14 and 28, 1997, the Authority subcontracted to private companies 
roadway pavement marking utilizing epoxy in the Buffalo and New York divisions, 
respectively. The Authority does not own any equipment suitable for use with epoxy. 
The price of epoxy-marking equipment is $395,000 per vehicle. Like the LDI, the epoxy 
marking equipment is contained on a vehicle which requires a driver and operators. 
Two to three people operate the epoxy applying equipment, one driving the vehicle and 
monitoring gauges and the others applying the epoxy. The epoxy paint and the glass 
beads are mixed, heat is utilized in the mixing process and the paint is applied to the 
pavement using high pressure. The paint feeding lines are not cleaned with water but 
must be cleaned with a hazardous material to avoid having the paint mixture solidify. 
The amount of pressure used to apply the epoxy is much greater than that used to 
apply the water-based paint, but the unit employees operate other equipment - the 
grade-all and the bulldozer- which generate a similar amount of pressure during use. 
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Mistakes in the use of the epoxy equipment could result in physical injury to the 
operators or extensive damage to the equipment that could require replacement of the 
entire system. There is less chance of physical injury or such extensive damage to the 
LDI resulting from improper usage. 
The Authority did not purchase epoxy-pavement marking equipment because of 
the cost involved in purchasing four vehicles, the uneconomical return of having one 
machine transported from division to division for painting every other year and the need 
to train one to four crews in its use or to have a team of employees travel with the 
equipment from division to division. 
The record does not evidence that any unit employees have lost their jobs or 
) been transferred as a result of the Authority's decision to subcontract the epoxy 
pavement marking. 
Discussion 
The Authority argues in its exceptions that the charge is untimely filed as its 
decision to subcontract pavement marking using epoxy was first implemented in 1993 
and the instant charge was not filed until 1997. The Authority's decision in 1993 to 
contract with a private company to mark pavement at certain, high traffic, interchanges 
in the Buffalo division was described by a nonunit supervisor to unit employees as an 
experiment in the use of epoxy by the Authority. That Fechter was not at the time the 
direct supervisor of the unit employees does not warrant a contrary finding, indeed, 
Fechter, as a Thruway Maintenance Specialist, coordinated the purchase of paint and 
••' equipment for the Authority for pavement marking. It follows that the Teamsters would . 
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rely upon his description of the 1993 project as experimental.3 That characterization is 
given support by the fact that the pavement marking using epoxy was not continued 
after 1993. In County of Onondaga,4 where the employer took action, but led the union 
to believe that its action was "experimental," a charge filed within four months of the 
date thatthe employer's action became-final-was found to be timely. Such a delay in the 
start of the filing clock will be countenanced only where, as here, the charging party 
may have a belief that the action at issue is not necessarily final and "that belief is 
reasonably attributable to statements and/or actions by the [employer]."5 
Here, the record reveals that it was not until August 14 and 28, 1997, that the 
Authority's plan to use epoxy for pavement marking certain interchanges became final 
when it subcontracted roadway pavement marking utilizing epoxy to private companies. 
The Teamsters had no knowledge of the Authority's subcontracting until that time and 
the charge, filed November 19, 1997, is, therefore, timely. 
We recently reiterated in our decision in City of Rome6, that in transfer of unit 
work cases, the charging party must establish that the work in issue was performed 
exclusively by unit employees and that the transferred work is substantially similar to 
the bargaining unit's work. The record supports the ALJ's finding that until 1993, any 
3See Deer Park Union Free Sch. Dist, 27 PERB P064 (1994); Mahopac Cent. 
Sch. Dist, 25 PERB P051 (1992). 
4
 12 PERB 1J3035 (1979), confd, 77 A.D.2d 783, 13 PERB fl7011 (4th Dept 
1980). 
5Great Neck Water Pollution Control Dist, 27 PERB 1J3057, at 3134 (1995). 
632 PERB H3058 (1999). 
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pavement marking using epoxy was only done by private contractors incidental to 
highway construction or rehabilitation projects. The performance of unit work by nonunit 
personnel as an incident of a different set of tasks or a larger project does not breach a 
union's exclusivity over that unit work.7 Likewise, the Authority's decision to use a 
private contractor in 1993 when it was testing the utilization of epoxy for pavement -
marking does not breach the Teamsters' exclusivity.8 
Relying upon our decision in State of New York (Division of Military and Naval 
Affairs) (hereafter, State of New York (DMNA)),9 the Authority argues that the use of 
private contractors to apply epoxy for pavement marking was the type of regular and 
open assignment "sufficient to prevent a union from establishing the needed exclusivity 
in fact over work transferred from a unit for performance by nonunit employees."10 
Because we have found that the use by the Authority in prior years of private 
contractors to apply epoxy was incidental to and a part of larger highway construction 
or rehabilitation projects, and that the use of private contractor to apply epoxy in 1993 
was "experimental", the Teamsters' awareness of the use of private contractors by the 
7SeeTown of Shawangunk, 31 PERB1J3036 (1998); Union-Endicott Cent. Sen. 
Dist, 29 PERB TJ3056 (1996), annulled on other grounds sub nom. Bd. ofEduc. of the 
Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 250 A.D.2d 82, 31 PERB 1J7016 (3d Dep't 
1998), motion for leave to appeal denied, 93 N.Y.2d 805, 32 PERB ^7006 (1999); 
W//age ofMalverne, 28 PERB 1J3042 (1995); County of Onondaga, 27 PERB ff3048 
(1994). 
8See County of Monroe, 28 PERB P025 (1995); County of Onondaga, supra 
note 7. 
927 PERB 1J3027 (1994). 
™City of Lackawanna, 31 PERB H3040, at 3089 (1998). 
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Authority does not, under State of New York (DMNA), compel a finding that the in-issue 
work has not been performed exclusively by unit employees. 
The Authority further argues that pavement marking utilizing epoxy is not 
substantially the same as the pavement marking performed by unit employees and that 
the qualifications for performance of pavement marking have been changedrthereby 
relieving it of its obligation to bargain the transfer of unit work with the Teamsters. As 
we decided in Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority:\ 
if the [at-issue] work had been performed by unit employees 
exclusively and... the reassigned tasks are substantially 
similar to those previously performed by unit employees... 
there has been a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act, unless 
the qualifications for the job have been changed 
significantly. Absent such a change, the loss of unit work to 
the group is sufficient detriment for the finding of a violation. 
If, however, there has been as significant change in the job 
qualifications, then a balancing test is invoked; the interests 
of the public employer and the unit employees, both 
individually and collectively/are weighed against each other. 
(Footnote omitted) 
The ALJ determined that the work of the bargaining unit was pavement marking 
and the work subcontracted by the Authority was pavement marking. We agree. The 
Authority relies on the use of different paint and different equipment to establish that the 
transferred work is not substantially similar to the work performed by those in the 
bargaining unit. We find that the use of epoxy paint and the equipment used for 
applying it to the roadways does not substantially alter the transferred work from the 
work of the unit. In the past, as technology has improved, the Authority has changed 
; 1118 PERB H3083, at 3182 (1985). 
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the material and equipment utilized by unit employees to mark pavement. On those 
occasions, the Authority has purchased the new equipment and material and had unit 
members trained in its use. The last purchase by the Authority of such equipment was 
the LDI in 1996. This resulted in a change in material and equipment utilized by the 
Authority to mark pavement and unit employees were trained to operate the LDIv-While 
the use of epoxy for pavement marking would require the Authority to purchase new 
equipment at a substantial cost and to train unit employees in the use of that 
equipment, that is precisely what the Authority has done in the past. A simple 
difference in equipment or design does not "by itself effect a loss of exclusivity or 
establish a dissimilarity in tasks or qualifications sufficient to permit an employer to 
subcontract or otherwise transfer unit work."12 Further, the fact that the Authority does 
not at present own equipment for marking pavement with epoxy does not warrant a 
contrary conclusion. The Authority points to County of Clinton™ as support for its 
argument that an employer may subcontract work that necessitates the use of 
equipment that the employer does not own. In County of Clinton, we found that the 
County did not violate the Act when it subcontracted part of a major construction project 
to a private contractor where it had done so in the past, where it did not own the 
necessary equipment, and unit employees were not trained in the use of the equipment. 
Here, the Authority subcontracted work in 1997 that has been exclusively performed by 
^Niagara Frontier Transit Metro Sys., Inc., 30 PERB 1J3068, at 3170 (1997). 
1328PERB 1J3041 (1995). 
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unit employees. Marking the pavement with epoxy was not part of a major roadway 
construction or rehabilitation project and here the Authority has a history of purchasing 
new pavement marking equipment and training employees in its use. That the Authority 
chose not to purchase equipment which utilized epoxy and instead bought equipment 
that used water-based paint doesnot obviate its duty tobargain.We have previously- •...- ,.._ 
found that the fiscal or operational wisdom of a decision to subcontract unit work is 
immaterial to the negotiability of the subject.14 
Finally, the Authority argues that the ALJ's decision and order have the effect of 
dictating the Authority's mode of operation and that the ALJ's order cannot be 
implemented. We disagree. The Authority is not directed to take any course of action by 
the ALJ's order beyond restoring unit work to the unit. The only restriction placed on the 
Authority is that required by the Act: the Authority may not unilaterally transfer exclusive 
bargaining unit work to nonunit employees in violation of §209-a.1(d). As to the remedy, 
the Authority is ordered to restore unit work to the unit and make whole unit members 
for the loss, if any, of wages or benefits. "[T]he purpose of our remedial orders is to 
make parties whole for the wrong sustained by placing them, as nearly as possible, in 
the position they would have been in had the improper practice not been committed."15 
HCity of Niagara Falls, 31 PERB 1J3085, at 3188 (1998). See also City of 
Poughkeepsie, 15 PERB 1J3045 (1982), confd, 95 A.D.2d 101, 16 PERB 1J7021 (3d 
Dep't 1983), appeal dismissed, 60 N.Y.2d 859, 16 PERB 1f7027 (1983); motion for 
leave to appeal denied, 62 N.Y.2d 602, 17 PERB H7009 (1984). 
^Burnt Hills-Ballston Lake Cent. Sch. Dist, 25 PERB 1J3066, at 3139 (1992). 
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The Authority and the Teamsters will determine whether and to what extent the unit 
members receive compensation as a result of the subcontract. 
We, therefore, find that the Authority violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act by 
unilaterally subcontracting pavement marking to private contractors on August 14 and 
28,1997. • .............: _ __, 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the Authority's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Authority forthwith shall: 
1. Restore the work of pavement marking to the unit represented by 
the Teamsters; 
2. Make unit members whole for the loss of wages and benefits, if 
any, with interest at the maximum legal rate, which occurred as a 
result of the Authority's transfer of the unit work of pavement 
marking on August 14 and August 28, 1997; 
3. Cease and desist from unilaterally subcontracting the unit work of 
pavement marking; and 
; 
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4. Sign and post the attached notice in all locations ordinarily used to 
post notices of information to employees in the unit represented by 
the Teamsters. 
DATED: March 31, 2000 
Albany, New York 
-12 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc'AfAbbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIG-EMPLOYEES1 FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the New York State Thruway Authority in the unit represented by New York 
State Thruway Employees, Teamsters Local 72, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO that the New York State Thruway Authority will forthwith: 
1. Restore the work of pavement marking to the unit represented 
by the Teamsters; 
2. Make unit members whole for the loss of wages and benefits, 
if any, with interest at the maximum legal rate., which occurred 
as a result of the New York State Thruway Authority's transfer 
of the unit work of pavement marking on August 14 and 
August 28, 1997; and 
3. Will refrain from unilaterally subcontracting the unit work of 
pavement marking. 
Dated By . . . . 
(Representative) (Title) 
New York State Thruway Authority 
T lotice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the d ate of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by 
ahy other material. 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MARCUS WHITMAN CUSTODIAL, MAINTENANCE 
AND FOOD SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
- a n d - CASE NO. CP-586 
MARCUS WHITMAN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
ROBERT SWAYZE, for Petitioner 
BRENT D. COOLEY, for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Marcus Whitman Central School District (District) excepts to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in which the ALJ determined that two newly-created 
titles, building maintenance supervisor and custodial supervisor, are most appropriately 
placed into a mixed unit of rank-and-file and supervisory employees represented by the 
Marcus Whitman Custodial, Maintenance and Food Service Employees Association 
(Association). The District argues that the new titles have supervisory duties which 
establish a conflict between the Association's bargaining concerns and the District's 
operational needs. Therefore, according to the District, the titles should not have been 
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placed in the Association's unit over its objection. The Association argues that the ALJ 
was correct in her uniting determination. For the following reasons, we affirm. 
FACTS 
The District operates three school buildings. The Association represents a small 
bargaining unitof maintenance and custodial workers,incIuding head custodians^ 
custodians, cleaners, groundskeepers, building maintenance mechanics, maintenance 
workers, food service helpers and food service clerks. The building maintenance 
mechanic and maintenance worker are generally responsible for construction, electrical, 
plumbing, and other mechanical work, while the custodians, cleaners and 
groundskeepers clean and maintain the District's buildings and grounds. 
) The custodial work in each of the District's three school buildings is supervised 
by one of the three unit head custodians. The head custodians formally evaluate the 
employees whom they supervise, assign their daily tasks, assign overtime, and approve 
requests for time off. Although rarely imposed, the head custodians have the authority 
to discipline their subordinates. In addition to their supervisory duties, the head 
custodians work alongside those whom they supervise. Significantly, the record shows 
that the inclusion of these supervisory titles in the Association's bargaining unit has not 
interfered with their ability, or willingness, to perform their supervisory tasks.1 
Until September 1998, the head custodians reported directly to the director of 
buildings and grounds, who, in turn, reports to the director of finance, operations and 
1See also Marcus Whitman Cent. Sch. Dist, 26 PERB 1J3018 (1993) (Board 
declined to fragment head custodians from the Association's bargaining unit). 
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personnel. In September 1998, the District divided its custodial and maintenance 
operations into two departments, custodial and building maintenance. At the same 
time, it created the two at-issue positions, custodial supervisor and building 
maintenance supervisor. Reporting to the director of buildings and grounds, the new 
positions oversee the custodial-and maintenance work in all three-of the District's 
school buildings. The relevant portions of their job descriptions, set forth in the ALJ's 
decision, establish that the new positions are front-line supervisors whose duties, like 
those of the head custodians, include the work of the rank-and-file employees. Indeed, 
contrary to the District's assertions to us, the job descriptions for the new titles are 
substantially similar to those of head custodians and unit maintenance mechanics. 
Furnare, the new custodial supervisor, and Smith, the new building maintenance 
supervisor, testified that they plan and prioritize the work to be done in all of the 
District's buildings. As needed, they train the employees as to how to do the work 
efficiently, and, whenever necessary, they assist them in doing the work. Furnare and 
Smith are responsible for obtaining the necessary parts, equipment and supplies. 
While Smith now supervises the day-to-day work of the maintenance mechanic and 
maintenance worker, the head custodians continue to supervise the day-to-day work of 
the custodians, cleaners and groundskeepers within their buildings. Although Smith 
and Furnare have input into the budget developed by the director of buildings and 
grounds, the record does not indicate the nature or extent of their input. For example, 
the record does not establish that their input concerns personnel matters. 
y 
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Despite the creation of the new supervisory titles, the record shows that the. 
District did not diminish or alter the supervisory responsibilities of the head custodians 
in any material way. Indeed, although the record shows that Smith and Furnare 
function as team leaders, there is a paucity of evidence concerning the nature or 
-degree ottheir supervisory-authority. The record does not establish, forexample,that 
either of the new supervisors has independent authority to impose disciplinary 
measures, to assign overtime, or to approve time off. These responsibilities continue to 
lie with the head custodians, who also continue to formally evaluate the custodians, 
cleaners and groundskeepers whom they supervise on a day-to-day basis. However, 
Smith testified that he formally evaluates the work of the maintenance mechanic and 
maintenance worker, apparently because they are no longer supervised by head 
custodians. 
Much of Fumare's testimony focused on his efforts to improve communications 
and working relationships among and between the head custodians and the rank-and-
file employees they supervise. To illustrate the point, Furnare testified that on two 
occasions he "wrote-up" head custodians for treating other employees in a demeaning 
manner. However, when asked what happened to the written statements, Furnare 
testified that he gave a copy to the head custodians, and that he put the other in his 
desk. He discussed a similar problem with the third head custodian, but did not 
memorialize the discussion in written form. On another occasion, Furnare told an 
employee that it was inappropriate for him to be playing basketball in a District building 
while on compensatory time off. According to Furnare, that behavior negatively 
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impacted on the morale of the others who are working. The employee acquiesced. 
Other than these low-level counselings and discussions, the record does not indicate 
what would happen if Furnare had determined that disciplinary measures were 
appropriate in any of those circumstances. 
In a-similar veinrFurnare testified that-he assisted an employee who had—-
difficulty prioritizing his work. The record does not indicate the nature of Furnare's 
authority to deal with the situation if it had not improved. Likewise, Smith testified that 
he is responsible for ensuring that building codes are met. The record does not 
indicate the nature of his authority to address deficiencies in the performance of the 
maintenance mechanic and maintenance worker if they fail to adhere to the codes. 
Furnare testified that he interviews candidates for custodial positions and that he 
recommends action by the District. According to Furnare, his recommendations have 
been adopted by higher authorities. On one occasion, he did not rehire a substitute 
cleaner after discussing the matter with the director of buildings and grounds and the 
superintendent.2 
DISCUSSION 
We have consistently held that the mere fact that a title performs supervisory 
responsibilities over others in a proposed bargaining unit does not necessarily preclude 
2ln its response to the petition, the District alleged that per diem substitute 
cleaners are not in the Association's bargaining unit, although in its brief to us it argues 
that they are. 
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its placement in the same unit.3 However, as the ALJ correctly observed: "We will not 
include a supervisor in a unit with rank-and-file employees over the objection of a party 
in interest if the degree and nature of the supervisory responsibilities indicate a conflict 
of interest."4 
Here, anypresumption of aconflict between the representational interests of the 
unit and the supervisory duties of the new titles is overcome by the fact that unit head 
custodians for many years have performed, and still perform, significant, albeit low-
level, supervisory duties without interference by the Association.5 
Moreover, the record establishes that the two new titles share a significant 
community of interest, not only with the head custodians with whom they share 
oversight and some supervisory responsibilities, but with the rank-and-file employees 
with whom they share the work.6 A contrary conclusion is not warranted by the simple 
fact that the new titles have responsibility for three school buildings while the head 
custodians are responsible for only one. On this record, we find the difference to be 
insignificant. Moreover, to the extent the custodial supervisor has any supervisory 
responsibility over the head custodians, absent evidence that the role is significant, his 
placement in the same bargaining unit is not inappropriate.7 Simply stated, although 
3See Duchess County BOCES, 25 PERB 1J3048 (1992). 
^Clinton Community College, 31 PERB H3070, at 3155 (1998). 
5See also Marcus Whitman Cent. Sch. Dist, 26 PERB 1J3018 (1993). 
6See New York State Div. of State Police, 1 PERB 1J399.32 (1967). 
7See Queensbury Union Free Sch. Dist, 27 PERB P035 (1994). 
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both of the new titles function as team leaders, they are yet members of the same front-
line team of supervisors and rank-and-file employees, and they belong in the same 
bargaining unit. 
Finally, the ALJ was entirely correct in her determination that the employees' 
desire to be-excluded from the unit is immaterial to the statutory uniting issue before— 
us.8 Indeed, if the felt-interests of the employees were a factor, bargaining units would 
fluctuate depending on the personalities of those involved. 
For the reasons set forth above, the District's exceptions are denied, and the 
ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the unit placement petition filed by the 
Association is granted and the positions of custodial supervisor and building 
maintenance supervisor are properly placed in the unit represented by the Association. 
DATED: March 31, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
7
 M&'rc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Greenburgh #11 Union Free 
School District (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an 
improper practice charge filed by the Greenburgh #11 Federation of Teachers 
(Federation), finding that the District violated §§209-a. 1 (a) and (d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally moved the location of 
grievance hearings, required Federation members to pass through a metal detector to 
enter the grievance hearing location and stationed armed security personnel both at the 
grievance hearing site and in the grievance hearing room. 
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The ALJ determined that the District's utilization of metal detectors and armed 
security guards was inherently intimidating and coercive and constituted a perse 
violation of §209-a.1 (a) of the Act.1 The ALJ further held that the District unilaterally 
changed the grievance procedure, a mandatory subject of negotiations, by setting the 
location of4he grievance hearings at the Gapitol-Theater, a location distant from the 
District, and by utilizing metal detectors and armed security personnel, in violation of 
§209-a.1(d) of the Act. He ordered the District to rescind the use of the Capitol Theater 
for grievance hearings and the use of metal detectors and armed security guards at 
grievance hearings. 
The District thereafter filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision arguing that the 
there was no evidence supporting the finding of a per se violation, that the District's 
measures were justified by the violence prevalent in schools today, that the aspects of 
the grievance procedure covered by the charge are nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiations, that the location of the grievance hearings was not alleged as a violation 
in the improper practice charge, that the ALJ's order is overly broad and that the ALJ's 
decision contains several factual errors. The District also excepts to the ALJ's 
characterization of the District's actions as "almost borderpng] on the paranoid" and to 
the ALJ's refusal to examine in camera several anonymous letters and memoranda. 
Attached to the District's exceptions are an affidavit from its counsel at hearing and an 
1The ALJ dismissed the alleged §209-a.1 (c) violation for lack of evidence that the 
District acted in retaliation for the exercise of any protected right. No exceptions have 
been taken to that finding and we, therefore, do not reach it in this decision. 
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affidavit from its counsel on this appeal, explaining the nature of the anonymous letters 
and memoranda attached to both affidavits, the District's reasons for offering the letters 
and memoranda for in camera review at the hearing before the ALJ and the reasons 
the District now offers the anonymous letters and memoranda for our consideration. 
The Federation thereafter-filed a motion to strike parts of the exceptions, 
supporting affidavits and the anonymous letters and memoranda. The District 
responded to and argued against the motion. We deferred decision on the,motion to 
strike and afforded the Federation the opportunity to file a response and/or cross-
exceptions to the District exceptions.2 
The Federation alleges in its response to the District's exceptions that the 
affidavits, anonymous letters and memoranda accompanying the District's exceptions 
should be stricken as there is no record evidence that the District ever offered the 
letters and memoranda for in camera review by the ALJ or into evidence at hearing. It 
further argues that the ALU's characterization of the District's behavior is not improper 
as the record is devoid of any credible evidence that the District administrators had 
been threatened by Federation representatives or members in such a way as to justify 
the security measures instituted by the District at grievance hearings. The Federation 
also argues that the ALJ's finding that the District's actions were a perse violation of 
§209-a.1(a) of the Act is correct because no evidence of animus is required for such a 
finding. The Federation further argues that the ALJ's finding that the District's actions 
) 232PERB 1J3068 (1999). 
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unilaterally changed the grievance procedure in violation of §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act is 
correct and that the ALJ correctly included the change of the location of the hearings in 
his findings. Finally, the Federation supports the ALJ's order as it is limited to the 
change in the grievance procedure, the issue before the ALJ. 
The Federation -included inits response several decisions of JudgeAldo-Nastasi, — — 
Supreme Court, Westchester County, which it had included with its post-hearing brief to 
the ALJ, finding the District in violation of the United States Constitution and the New 
York State Open Meetings Law, for imposing security measures on the members of the' 
public attending its Board of Education meetings. 
The District then filed a response to the Federation's response, arguing that the •••• 
Federation had raised factual and legal arguments not raised before the ALJ. Attached 
to the District's response to the Federation's response is a deposition by George N. 
Longworth, Chief of Police of Dobbs Ferry Police Department, taken in an unrelated 
Federal Court action. The deposition refers to events which took place in the District on 
June 24, 1994 and which are the subject of previous proceedings before us involving 
the Federation and the District.3 The Federation objects to the District's response to its 
response. 
3See Greenburgh No.11 Union Free Sch. Dist, 30 PERB 1J3052 (1997), aff'd in 
pertinent part sub nom., Greenburgh Union Free Sch. Dist. No.11 v. Kinsella, 253 AD2d 
46, 32 PERB ^7004 (3d Dep't 1999), motion for leave to appeal denied, 32 PERB 
1J7014(1999). 
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Procedural Matters 
Initially, we dispose of several procedural matters raised by the parties to this 
proceeding. The District seeks to introduce into the record before us for our 
consideration numerous anonymous letters and memoranda detailing anonymous 
telephone calls allegedly received by the District at a time- proximate,to the incidents in...-.- •.._-... 
the improper practice charge before us. The letters and memoranda were not made 
part of the record before the ALJ. Indeed, there is nothing in the hearing record to 
support the District's assertion that the letters were even offered for in camera review 
by the ALJ or that the documents were offered into evidence. In fact, the District's 
counsel at the hearing indicated on the record, after an off-the-record discussion 
between the ALJ and the representatives of the Federation and the District, that "[w]e're 
going to withdraw any reference to anonymous letters and we're not going to rely on 
anonymous letters in this case". 
This Board will consider only the evidence accepted and made a part of the 
record before the ALJ, unless one of the exceptions before us is an alleged erroneous 
refusal by the ALJ to accept proffered material into evidence or unless some other 
extraordinary circumstance, such as newly discovered evidence, exists.4 While the 
District alleges that the ALJ erroneously refused its request that he conduct an in 
camera review of the anonymous letters and the memoranda, there is no record 
J 4United Univ. Professions, Inc., 21 PERB fl3052 (1988). 
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evidence that such a request was ever made.5 Certainly, if such a request was made off 
the record and was refused by the ALJ, the District should have taken exception to the 
ruling once the parties were back on the record.6 Instead, the record evidences that the 
District withdrew any reference to the letters from the record. The District argues in its 
exceptions that it-had a concern that the Federation might be able toascertain the— 
identity of the authors of the anonymous letters by viewing them and, therefore, decided 
not to introduce the documents into evidence at the hearing. However, the District's 
perceived need at the hearing for secrecy is not the type of extraordinary circumstance 
which would warrant this Board's acceptance of the documents into the record now for 
our consideration.7 We, therefore, grant the Federation's motion to strike and decline to 
accept the affidavits, anonymous letters and memoranda included in the District's 
exceptions in this case. 
5Likewise, in its brief to the ALJ, the District did not address the ALJ's alleged 
refusal to review in camera the anonymous letters and memoranda. 
6PERB's review of the ALJ's decision is limited to matters included in the original 
charge or developed at the formal hearing. Any exception to an ALJ's ruling not 
specifically raised is waived. (See Margolin v. Newman, 130 AD2d 312, 20 PERB 
1J7018 (3d Dep't 1987), appeal dismissed, 71 NY2d 844, 21 PERB ^7005 (1988); 
Rules, §212.4(h)). See also City of Rye, 13 PERB P039, cont'd sub nom. Banahan v. 
PERB, "13 PERB 1J7012 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1980). 
7See Law Enforcement Officers Union Council 82, AFSCME (Gardner), 31 PERB 
lf3076 (1998); United Fed'n of Teachers and Bd. ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the 
City of New York (Grassel), 23 PERB j[3042 (1990). 
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Likewise, we will not accept the District's response to the Federation's response 
to the District's exceptions or the Federation's response to the District's response. 
Section 213.3 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules), provides: 
No pleading other than exceptions, cross-exceptions or a 
response thereto will be accepted or considered by the 
board unless -it-is requested by the board orfiled with the - — 
board's authorization. Such additional pleadings will not be 
requested or authorized by the board unless the preceding 
pleading properly raises issues which are material to the 
disposition of the matter for the first time. 
The Federation's response does not raise any new matters that would lead us to 
request or authorize a response from the District.8 In fact, it is the District which seeks 
with its response to introduce evidence that was not before the ALJ in support of its 
argument that the District's actions were motivated by legitimate concerns for the safety 
of its administrators. 
Finally, the District asserts that the ALJ erred in considering the location of the 
grievance hearings at the Capitol Theater as part of the Federation's improper practice 
charge because it was not one of the alleged violations. It is this Board's general 
practice to hold parties to normal standards of precision in the drafting of pleadings.9 
The charge as filed by the Federation alleges that 
8The decisions of Judge Nastasi that were included with the Federation's 
response were also included in the Federation's brief to the ALJ. Further, we may take 
administrative notice of court decisions. See Local 1170 of the Communications 
Workers of America, 23 PERB fl3004 (1990). 
Nassau County Local 830, CSEA (Haugen), 19 PERB 1J3024 (1986). 
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8. The Capitol Theater was chosen by the District, a site 
previously objected to by the Federation. 
9. On October 30, 1997 and December 4, 1997 Federation 
President John Goetschius corresponded with 
Superintendent Mallah objecting to her notice to the 
Federation that grievance hearings (for October 22 and 
December 8 and December 9) would be held at the Capitol 
Theater and that Federation officials-would-berequired-to-
pass through metal detectors. On both occasions grievance 
hearings were moved to another site and Federation officials 
were not required to pass through metal detector. 
At the hearing, the Federation introduced evidence about the location of the 
grievance hearings and its objection to the District's choice of the Capitol Theater. The 
District introduced evidence in support of its use of the Capitol Theater. The Federation 
likewise briefed the issue in its memorandum of law to the ALJ. The District objected to 
the Federation's inclusion of the location of the grievance hearings in its post-hearing >• 
brief and urged the ALJ not to consider the allegation. In his decision, the ALJ, without 
addressing the District's argument, considered the location of the grievance hearings to 
be one of the violations of §209-a.1(d) of the Act included in the charge. 
The Board will not find an improper practice which is not alleged in a charge or a 
timely amendment thereto.10 Here, however, the location of the grievance hearings at 
the Capitol Theater was specifically included in the details of the charge; that it was not 
10See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist, 25 PERB 1J3001 (1992); East Rockaway Union 
Free Sch. Dist, 18 PERB P069 (1985); United Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2 (Kauder), 
18 PERB j[3048 (1985); East Moriches Teachers Ass'n, NYSUT (Upham), 14 PERB 
lf3056(1981). 
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specifically listed in the conclusory paragraph of the charge does not compel a finding 
that the allegation was not properly before the ALJ. 
Facts 
The record facts are largely undisputed. The Federation represents a unit of 
pedagogical employees of the District, a special act districtwhich serves exclusivelythe 
residents of Children's Village, a private residential treatment facility. The last collective 
bargaining agreement between the District and the Federation expired in 1992. The 
relationship between the District and the Federation and their conduct of labor relations 
has been the subject of several improper practice charges before us.11 
As a result of picketing a District function in 1994, several teachers represented 
by the Federation were reassigned from the District's campus to various public libraries 
in neighboring communities to write curriculum.12 The District thereafter proffered 
disciplinary charges against a number of the teachers who are assigned to the libraries, 
alleging attendance violations. It is the grievances on those charges that were 
scheduled by the District to be heard on March 25 and 30, 1998. The Federation had 
protested the use of the Capitol Theater as it is fifteen to twenty miles from the school. 
The Federation also objected to the use of metal detectors. When the District refused to 
"Supra note 3. See also Greenburgh No.11 Union Free Sch. Dist, 32 PERB 
1J3035(1999). 
12Several of the teachers were also involved in a gathering outside of the office 
of the Superintendent of Schools, Sandra Mallah, to protest disciplinary charges being 
levied for the picketing. See the decision cited in note 3, supra, for the details of those 
activities and our findings thereon. 
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relocate the grievance hearings or rescind the use of the metal detectors, the 
Federation acquiesced and agreed to the location and the detectors so that the 
hearings would not be further postponed.13 The District scheduled approximately eleven 
grievances to be heard individually at ten minute intervals on the first day of hearing 
and nine grievances for the seconddayof-hearing. - - — 
When John Goetschius, the Federation president, and three other Federation 
members arrived for the first day of hearing, a metal detector, staffed by two 
technicians, was set up in the lobby of the Capitol Theater. Also present in the lobby 
were Frank Brabham, head of security for the District, and two armed off-duty police 
officers. Goetschius and the three Federation members were made to empty their 
pockets and pass through the metal detector before they could enter the theater.14 
There was an armed police officer present in the theater during the grievance hearings, 
seated approximately fifteen to twenty feet from the table used by the District and 
Federation representatives. Brabham came and went during the hearings. Goetschius 
objected to no avail to the presence of the security guards in the hearing area. The 
District representatives entered the theater through a side door and did not pass 
13The hearings were originally scheduled for October 22,1997. 
14Goetschius was also required to empty the bag he was carrying. One 
Federation member, Roy Polonio, could not pass successfully through the metal 
detector and was required to scan himself with a handheld scanner until he was 
cleared. 
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through the metal detectors.15 The same procedure was utilized on the second day of 
hearing, although only Goetschius and two Federation members were present for the 
Federation. 
The District's stated reasons for the location of the grievance hearings and the 
implementation of the security measures were the 1994 demonstrations by Federation 
unit members and three other events involving Federation members. First, as a result of 
a background check conducted by Brabham shortly after his employment by the District 
in 1994, the District learned that two Federation members involved in the 1994 
demonstrations had target pistol permits issued by the County of Westchester. Second, 
also in 1994, Brabham learned that a former District employee had been stopped for a 
minor traffic infraction on the Saw Mill Parkway. He was pulled over on a road that 
leads to the District. It was later discovered that there was a loaded pistol in his car. 
Third, at a District Board of Education meeting, where Brabham had also set up metal 
detectors, a Federation member was found to have a paint scraper containing a razor 
blade in his pocket. 
The District proffered one other reason for the security measures surrounding 
the grievance hearings and that was the large number of individuals who would be 
attending each day of hearing. However, the record demonstrates that it was Mallah 
15The District's Assistant Superintendent of Buildings and Grounds, Art 
Messenger, passed through the metal detectors. Brabham testified that three other 
people present also passed through the metal detectors but these individuals are not 
identified on the record. The owner of the theater may also have been required to pass 
through the metal detector. 
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who scheduled the hearings and no reasons were given as to why so many grievances 
were scheduled on each day. Thus, if the District was afraid that there might be an 
incident because so many of the Federation members would be gathered together at 
one time, the District provided no reasons why it did not reschedule the hearings on 
separate daysior each-individual - ---. -
Discussion 
The ALJ determined that the District had established no justification for the 
implementation of the security measures at the March 25 and 30, 1998 grievance 
hearings. Finding that the utilization of metal detectors and armed security guards at a 
grievance hearing without justification was inherently intimidating and coercive, the ALJ 
determined that the District's actions were a perse violation of §209-a.1 (a) of the Act. 
We have recognized that the right of public employees to be represented in 
grievances is one of the most important afforded them by the Act.1- We have also held 
that the deprivation of fundamental employee rights, however erroneous or innocent, 
violates § 209-a.1(a).1.17 Such a violation involves conduct which has a chilling effect 
upon the organizational rights of unit employees and to which we may impute improper 
motivation because the action of the employer discourages unit employees from 
exercising the rights protected by the Act.18 In such a case, even if there is no 
^State of New York (Diaz), 18 PERB 1J3047 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, 132 
AD2d 430, 20 PERB fl7024 (3d Dep't 1987), affd, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB fl7017 
(1988). 
nCity ofNewburgh, 11 PERB 1J3108 (1978), cont'd, 70 AD2d 362, 12 PERB 
1J7020 (3d Dep't 1979). 
™Plainedge Public Schools, 13 PERB P037 (1980). See also State of New 
York, 10 PERB 1J3108 (1977) (erroneous interpretation of the Act's contract bar rules 
causing an improper denial of representation access rights). 
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independent evidence of union animus or hostility toward the union or the union 
member involved, a prima facie case is established. The act of the employer itself, 
being so inimical to the exercise of rights protected by the Act, establishes the 
violation.19 
— -..•---.-The-Act^equires--that-an-employer-act.-''deliberately--''for-.the-pu.rposaof--depriving 
[public employees] of such rights" in order for a violation of §209-a.1(a) to be found. We 
can, under the right circumstances, presume the employer's awareness of the logical 
consequences of its actions rather than hold the charging party to proving "actual" 
awareness. More difficult is imposing liability on a presumption of culpable motive 
where an innocent motive or justification is raised. In State of New York,20 PERB first 
articulated a standard of proof to the effect that where an employer's conduct is so 
inherently destructive of a §202 right it must be "irrebuttably presumed" to have been 
engaged in "for the purpose df depriving them of such rights." This statement indicates 
that such an assumption is "conclusive" and when made, cannot be contradicted, 
modified or explained.21 This makes it a substantive, rather than a procedural, rule.22 
Given the culpable motive element contained in our statute, we now hold that the 
irrebuttal presumption found in State of New York (and thus the perse violation) was 
improperly made. The effect of that "rule" would be a substantive change in the statute 
by eliminating the motive element from the proof necessary to sustain a charge. Only 
™State of New York (Dep't of Health and Roswell Park Memorial Institute), 
26 PERB 1|3072 (1993). 
2010 PERB p 108 (1977). 
21Fisch, New York Evidence, Presumptions fi1121. 
22See People v. Nemadi, 140 Misc2d 712 (1988); Heinerv. Greenwich Savings 
Bank, 118 Misc. 326 (1922); In Re Buchanan's Estate, 184 AD 237 (1918). 
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the legislature would have the power to do so. Our charge is to interpret the law, not to 
re-write it. The better rule would be to hold that the facts make out a "permissive 
presumption", which is favored in New York law and which would shift the burden of 
proof to the responding party to destroy the presumption by sufficient proof to the 
-contrary,^ — — --< --:--- — ^ 
In the instant case, having alleged a violation consisting of conduct so inherently 
destructive of the employees' §202 rights, the Federation was entitled to a presumption 
that the District's actions were undertaken for the purpose of depriving such employees 
of such rights. Despite his finding of a perse violation, the ALJ considered the District's 
defense and found it insufficient justification for the District's actions. Although we are 
cognizant of the issue of violence in the workplace and in our schools and recognize 
that security measures are becoming a "fact of life" in our society,23 we still find the 
District's proffered reasons for the implementation of the various security measures 
unpersuasive and insufficient to rebut the presumption that they were undertaken for 
23ln its exceptions, the District alludes to the atmosphere of violence that exists in 
America's schools and in some workplaces as additionally justifying its implementation 
of the security measures at-issue in this case. These arguments were not made to the 
ALJ and are, therefore, not appropriately before us. Even were we to consider the 
District's arguments in this regard, we would reject them. This "general atmosphere of 
violence" provides no basis for the District's actions directed at only Federation 
members engaged in protected activity. Further, there is no record evidence of 
violence occurring at the school or at any District function in proximity to or 
contemporaneous with the grievance hearings. The events of June 24, 1994, the only 
record evidence of an incident between the Federation and District representatives, 
occurred almost four years before the grievance hearings at-issue here and the events 
of that day were found to be "not of the nature that would cause a reasonable person to 
react" with fear by this Board and the courts. See Greenburgh No.11 Union Free Sch. 
Dist, 30 PERB 1J3052, at 3130 (1999), aff'd in pertinent part sub nom. Greenburgh 
No.11 Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kinsella, 32 PERB 1J7004 (1999). 
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the purpose of depriving the employees of their statutory rights by chilling their exercise 
thereof and by erecting unnecessary obstacles in the path of the grievance process. 
The right to have grievances filed and processed by an employee's bargaining 
representative must be viewed as one of the basic rights protected by §203 of the Act. 
The District-s implementation of security measures in the circumstances of this case 
must be seen as striking at the very heart of this protected right. If the security 
measures imposed by the District continue, then employees know that if they file a 
grievance, they must pass through metal detectors and proceed in the presence of 
armed security guards. A Federation member who aspires to be a Federation 
representative knows that if called upon to process grievances on behalf of the 
membership, he or she will be subjected to metal detectors and armed security 
personnel. Such measures are contrary to the purpose of a grievance procedure as 
contemplated by the Act.24 The Act affords public employees the right to be 
represented by an employee organization both in negotiations with the public employer 
in the determination of terms and conditions of employment as well as in the 
administration of grievances arising thereunder.25 Employer conduct which has the 
effect of interfering with the rights of unit employees to be represented by their 
employee organization violates §209-a.1(a) of the Act.26 
24Act, §200. 
25Act, §§203, 204.2 and 208. 
26See County of Rockland and Rockland County Community College, 13 PERB 
1J3089 (1980), where the Board held that it was a violation of §209-a. 1 (a) of the Act to 
interfere with the rights of unit employees to be represented by their employee 
organization, and Comsewogue Union Free Sch. Dist, 15 PERB TJ3018 (1982), where a 
union official was protected in providing advice to a unit employee regarding a 
contractual matter. 
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The District argues that there is no evidence in the record that the security 
measures actually interfered with the Federation's grievance prosecution. The standard 
is not whether a specific employee was actually "chilled" in the exercise of protected 
rights, but rather whether the employer's action has the necessary effect of chilling 
employeesin the exercise of protected rights.27 Based on theevidence adduced atthe 
hearing, we find, therefore, that the District's utilization of metal detectors and armed 
security personnel at the grievance hearings on March 25 and March 30, 1998, violated 
§209-a.1(a)oftheAct. 
We turn now to the alleged violation of §209-a. 1(d) of the Act occasioned by the 
District's unilateral alteration of the contractual grievance procedure by changing the 
location of the grievance hearings and implementing the use of metal detectors and 
armed security personnel at the grievance hearings. Grievance procedures are terms 
and conditions of employment and are, thus, mandatorily negotiable.28 It follows, then, 
that unilateral changes in the grievance procedure violate §209-a.1 (d) of the Act, 
unless, on balance, there is a determination that the employer's managerial concerns 
predominate. 
The District argues that its safety concerns outweigh any real or perceived 
inconvenience to employees attending grievance hearings. A balance of interests must, 
27See County of Monroe and Monroe County Sheriff v. Newman, 125 AD2d 
1002, 20 PERB 1J7001 (4th Dep't 1986); Brunswick Cent. Sch. Dist, 19 PERB 1J3063 
(1986). 
28See Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of Newburgh, New York, Inc., 18 PERB 
1J3065 (1985), affdsub nom. City of Newburgh v. Newman, 19 PERB 1J7005 (Sup. Ct. 
Albany County). 
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therefore, be undertaken, directed to the nature of the subject matter in issue.29 
Balancing the intrusive nature of the security measures implemented by the District with 
the safety concerns articulated by the District in its case before the ALJ, we find, for the 
reasons set forth in our discussion of the §209-a.1(a) violation, that the employees' 
interests under the Actpredominate because the facts here indicate a -clear-— 
preponderance on one side: the employees' interest in utilization of the grievance 
procedure.30 We, therefore, find that the District violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it 
unilaterally scheduled the grievance hearings at the Capitol Theater and implemented 
the use of metal detectors and armed security personnel at grievance hearings. 
We turn finally to the District's exception dealing with the ALJ's characterization 
in his decision that the District's actions "almost border...on the paranoid." We find that 
the language used by the ALJ was inappropriate. The ALJ was in no position to make a 
clinical psychological diagnosis of the motivation of the District's administrators in 
implementing security measures at grievance hearings. If the language was intended 
only to illustrate the ALJ's opinion of the merit of the reasons articulated by the District 
for implementing the at-issue security measures, then less inflammatory, more judicious 
language could have, and should have, been used.31 We do not find, however, that the 
ALJ's characterization reflects a bias which would warrant disturbing his factual 
findings, which are fully supported by the record evidence, or his legal conclusions. 
29See State of New York (Dep't of Transp.), 27 PERB 1J3056 (1994). 
30See State of New York, 18 PERB fl3064 (1985); County of Rensselaer, 13 
PERB H3080(1980). 
31
 See Manual for Hearing Officers in Administrative Adjudication, New York State 
Civil Service Commission, Rev. Man. No.16 (1972). 
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Based on the foregoing, the District's exceptions are denied and the decision of 
the ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Rescind the utilization of the Capitol Theater for the conduct of grievance 
hearings involving employees in the unit represented by the Federation; 
2. Rescind the utilization of electronic security devices, including but not 
limited to, metal detectors and wands for bodily and article searches as a 
condition precedent to entrance to grievance hearings involving 
employees in the unit represented by the Federation; 
3. Rescind the use of security personnel, including armed security 
personnel, at the entrance of or within the hearing room utilized for 
grievance hearings involving employees in the unit represented by the 
Federation; and 
4. Sign and post the attached notice in all locations normally used to post 
communications to unit employees. 
DATED: March 31, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
/ Jdhn T. Mitchell, Member 
U 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES^ FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Greenburgh #11 Union Free School District in the unit represented by 
Greenburgh #11 Federation of Teachers that the Greenburgh #11 Union Free School District will forthwith: 
1. Rescind the utilization of the Capitol Theater for the conduct of 
grievance hearings involving employees in the unit represented by 
the Federation; 
2. Rescind the utilization of electronic security devices, including but not 
limited to, metal detectors and wands for bodily and article searches 
} as a condition precedent to entrance to grievance hearings involving 
employees in the unit represented by the Federation;and 
3. Rescind the use of security personnel, including armed security 
personnel, at the entrance of or within the hearing room utilized for 
grievance hearings involving employees in the unit represented by 
the Federation. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
Greenburgh #11 Union Free School District 
Trus Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the d ate of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by 
any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 317, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4859 
VILLAGE OF BELMONT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 317, International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named pubiic employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4859 page 2 
Included: All regular full-time and regular part-time Streets, Water and Sewer 
Department employees including Heavy Motor Equipment 
Operators, Motor Equipment Operators, Working Foremen and 
Chief of Operations and Laborers. 
Excluded: Clerical, Elected Officials, Police and Firefighters. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with Teamsters Local 317, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation 
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 31, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Mich/el R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/Jo/in T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, 
LOCAL 200B, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4966 
CENTRAL SQUARE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Service Employees International Union, 
Local 200B, has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: All substitute bus drivers who work a minimum of 150 hours per 
school year. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Service Employees International Union, Local 200B. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 31, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
/ Jjbhn T. Mitchell, Member 
U 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PERU SUPPORT STAFF ASSOCIATION/NEA/NY, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4945 
PEWOENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT; 
Employer, 
-and-
C1VIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding- having been conducted in the above matter by the Public 
Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating representative 
has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
-The petition sought to decertify the intervenor and be certified as the negotiating 
representative. 
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negotiations and the settlement of grievances: 
Included: All employees of the transportation staff, clerical staff, food service 
staff, teacher aide staff, monitor staff, maintenance staff and custodial 
staff. 
Excluded: Substitute employees in any category listed above, District office 
..._ personnel1.-head.automotiv-e.mecJhan.i.c,._head..bus..d.riyer.,_s.chool.l.unch._.-._ 
manager, federally funded teacher aides, teacher assistants, 
superintendent of buildings and grounds. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 31, 2000 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
r f - - -
/ / // 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
